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SENTENCING DISPARITY AND JURY
PACKING: FURTHER CHALLENGES
TO THE DEATH PENALTY
JOSEPH E. JACOBY* AND
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER**
No legal sanction has produced more debate and greater contro-
versy than capital punishment. Although the debate on the death pen-
alty encompasses many issues, including its deterrent effect and moral
justification, a recurrent theme has been the manner in which it has
been applied. Critics of capital punishment have pointed out that, as
historically applied, the death penalty has been discriminatory, with a
greater proportion of executions for blacks compared with whites. This
position was argued by counsel for Furman in the landmark case, Furman
v. Georgia.' Other sources of institutional discrimination and bias in
capital cases, such as jury selection procedures, have also been identified.
Recognizing the history of systematic biases in the states' use of the
death penalty, the Supreme Court has tried to eliminate procedural ir-
regularities from the death sentencing process. In two notable cases,
Witherspoon v. Illinois2 and Gregg v. Georgia,3 the Court suggested formal
guidelines and standards for capital cases to reduce arbitrariness and
capriciousness. Although these two decisions were designed to eliminate
the discriminatory practices producing the disproportionate execution
of blacks, our investigation of the constitutionally approved death pen-
alty law in one southern state, South Carolina, indicates that, rather
than being eliminated, discrimination and bias have simply taken more
sophisticated forms: (1) "partial" discrimination, where white and black
offenders appear to be equally likely to be sentenced to death until the
race of the victim is considered, and (2) a more masked form of discrimi-
nation at the jury selection stage where the attitudes of potential jurors
* Assistant Professor of Sociology, Bowling Green State University; Ph.D. University of
Pennsylvania, 1975.
** Assistant Professor, College of Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina; Ph.D.
Florida State University, 198.
1 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
3 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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are decisive in the probability of their selection for jury service in death
cases, with a subsequent effect on the verdict and sentence.
There is evidence from investigations in other states that such hid-
den forms of discrimination do exist in constitutionally acceptable death
penalty statutes. In relation to the role of victim's race and the death
sentence, Foley traced, from indictment through sentencing, every per-
son indicted for first degree murder (N=829) in twenty-one of sixty-
seven Florida counties for the years 1972-1978.4 She found that "the
more overt racial discrimination in cases prior to the 1972 Supreme
Court decision has been eliminated." 5 In Florida, black defendants in-
dicted for murder were more likely to be found guilty than were whites;
if found guilty, blacks were not, however, more likely to receive the
death penalty. 6 The important selection factor for the death penalty
was the race of the victim. Even after controlling for the offender's and
victim's occupations, number of prior convictions, and the number of
victims in the incident, defendants charged with killing whites were sub-
stantially more likely to receive the death penalty once found guilty
than were defendants charged with killing blacks. 7
Bowers and Pierce found the same pattern of discrimination based
on the race of victim post-Funnan (through 1977) in Florida, Georgia,
Ohio and Texas." In all four states, the race of the victim was a much
more important determinant of the sentence than the race of the defend-
ant. A defendant had a much greater chance of receiving the death
penalty if he was convicted of killing a white than if the victim 'was
black.9 All four states showed substantial interaction between race of
offender and race of victim, with the black offender/white victim case
being the most likely to result in the death penalty in all four states.1°
There is also some preliminary evidence on the even more complex
form of discrimination produced at jury selection when potential jurors
are screened out of capital trials because they oppose capital punish--
ment. This screening of jurors focuses on the process of the voir dire in
capital cases, a process called "death-qualification." In the Witherspoon
4 L. Foley, Florida After the Furman Decision: Discrimination in the Imposition of the
Death Penalty (1980) (paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Capital Pun-
ishment in Atlanta, Apr. 19, 1980); L. Foley, The Effect of Race on the Imposition of the
Death Penalty (1979) (paper presented at the meeting of American Psychological Association
in New York, Sept. 1979).
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at 6.
7 Id. at 7.
8 BOWERS & PIERCE, Arbitrariness and Discr'mination under Post-Furman Capital Statues, 26
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 563 (1980).
9 Id. at 595.
10 Id. at 597.
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case, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the then existing Illinois
death statute, which permitted the exclusion for cause of any venire-
man who had "conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction
of the death penalty in a proper case."" The Court held that such a
selection process produced a jury biased unfairly towards the death pen-
alty, and articulated a more equitable standard of death-qualification.
This standard, adopted virtually nationwide, permits venire-men in cap-
ital cases to be excluded for cause if they claim either that they can
imagine no circumstance in which, as jurors, they could vote for the
death penalty, or that knowledge that the defendant, if convicted, could
receive the death penalty would keep them from being able to render
fair and impartial decisions on the question of guilt.
The purpose of the Witherspoon death-qualification standard, then,
was to produce a jury less biased in its attitudes toward the death sen-
tence contributing to its more equitable application. Sporadic research
since Witherspoon has questioned whether or not Witherspoon death-quali-
fied juries are less biased towards conviction and the death penalty. The
data tentatively suggest that the death-qualification process excludes
certain subgroups of the population and produces a high degree of atti-
tudinal homogeneity with regard to conviction and penalty. A 1971
Harris poll of a nationally representative sample found jury selection
based on the Witherspoon questions would result in the underrepresenta-
tion of blacks, of people with less than a high school education, and
people with certain religious beliefs (especially Jews and Agnostics) on
capital juries. 12
Further evidence of the bias inherent in the death-qualification
process was reviewed in a recent California case, Hooey v. California.13
The experimental jury studies cited in Hove revealed that juries quali-
fied on the Witherspoon standard have identifiable characteristics.14
They are, first of all, biased in favor of the prosecution by being more
likely to consider constitutional rights mere technicalities and more
likely to believe the prosecutor's than the defense's arguments. Sec-
ondly, Witherspoon-qualified juries are more likely to convict than non-
qualified juries. Thirdly, they underrepresent certain identifiable
subgroups of the population, such as blacks. Finally, excluding prospec-
tive jurors on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty degraded
the quality of the deliberations in that excludable jurors remembered
11 391 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted).
12 White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-Q raifedJuries, 58 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 1176, 1186 (1973).
13 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d,1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
14 Id. at 26-59, 616 P.2d at 1314-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 141-68.
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more of the details of the case and examined the evidence m6re
critically.
These preliminary findings suggest that post-Witherspoon death-
qualification procedures may produce unrepresentative juries and jurors
biased toward conviction and the death sentence, precisely the outcome
that the Supreme Court wanted to avoid when it articulated the Wither-
spoon standard. This research note reports more recent and more defini-
tive data on the existence of both forms of discrimination in the death
penalty procedures of one southern state.
METHODS
The two forms of discrimination alluded to in the paragraphs
above required two different data collection strategies. To examine the
effect of the race of the victim in the imposition of the death penalty, we
examined all cases of homicide in South Carolina in which the death
penalty could have been sought from June 8, 1977, through November
30, 1979. South Carolina passed a new death penalty statute, which
became effective on June 7, 1977.15 The statute lists seven aggravating
circumstances, at least one of which must be found to be present beyond
a reasonable doubt, for the court to order a death sentence. A review of
the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division's Supplemental
Homicide Reports from June 8, 1977, through November 30, 1979, re-
vealed 205 cases of murder that met the statutory condition requiring at
least one aggravating circumstance.' 6 (The presence of an aggravating
circumstance is noted on the initial police homicide report, then tran-
scribed to the Supplemental Homicide Report.) During that same time
period, there were fifty-seven defendants against whom prosecutors had
sought the death penalty. The races of the victims and defendants were
furnished by circuit solicitors and public documents.
Data pertaining to jury attitudes and excludability from jury serv-
ice were obtained from two telephone surveys conducted in South Caro-
lina. The surveys were conducted in two separate counties of the state,
one in September 1980 and the second in October 1981. In the first
survey, a random sample of 205 registered voters in the county (South
Carolina selects jurors from voter registration lists) were interviewed by
telephone regarding their knowledge of an actual murder case that was
coming up for trial in that county. Those who knew of the case were
asked about the conclusions they had drawn about the guilt of the de-
fendant, the appropriate penalty should the defendant be found guilty,
and their attitude toward the death penalty. Identical questions about
15 S.C. CODE § 16-3-20 (Supp. 1976).
16 STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, STATE REPORT (South Carolina 1980).
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TABLE 1
PROSECUTOR'S DECISIONS TO REQUEST THE DEATH PENALTY
FOR AGGRAVATED HOMICIDE BY RACE OF VICTIM AND
RACE OF DEFENDANT
Number ofd Proportion of
Defendantsc  Defendants for Defendants for Ratio
Race of a  Race of b in Aggravated whom death pen- whom death pen- Between Probability
Defendant Victim Homicide Cases alty was requested alty was requested Proportions of Difference
all all 205 57 .278 - -
white all 67 27 .403 1.3:1 .05
black 97 30 .309
all W 148 51 .345 3.2:1 .0001
B 55 6 .109
black W 60 26 .433 3.9:1 .0001
black B 36 4 .111
white W 57 25 .439 2.0:1 .05
white B 9 2 .222
white W 57 25 .439 1.0:1 .24
black W 60 26 .433
white B 9 2 .222 2.0:1 .10
black B 36 4 .111
white W 57 25 .439 4.0:1 .001
black B 36 4 .111
white B 9 2 .222 2.0:1 .06
black W 60 26 A33
a The race of the defendant was not known in 41 out of 205 cases of aggravated homicide cases
reported by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED).
b The race of the victim was not known in 2 out of 105 aggravated homicide cases reported by
SLED.
c Source: SLED, Supplemental Homicide Reports.
d Source: Various court transcripts, newspaper accounts, circuit solicitors and their employees,
county clerks of court, sheriff's employees.
another actual murder case were asked of a random sample of 159 regis-
tered voters in the county where that case was soon to be tried. For
economy of presentation, the data from both telephone surveys were
combined after initial separate analyses revealed identical findings.
RESULTS
The data pertaining to discrimination in the sentencing of white
and black murder defendants are summarized in Table 1. During the
first twenty-nine months of South Carolina's new death penalty statute,
prosecutors were significantly more likely to request the death penalty
for whites than blacks charged with aggravated murder. From this it
JA COB Y AND PA TERNOSTER [Vol. 73
TABLE 2
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY RESPONSE DISTRIBUTION




Do you remember hearing or Yes 94.8% 364
reading anything about the No 5.2%
case?
From what you know about Probably guilty 46.2% 318
this case right now, do you Probably not-guilty 7.5%
think the person charged with Don't know 46.3%
this murder is:
If the person charged with this The death penalty 33.8% 302
crime is found guilty in court, Life imprisonment 32.8%
what penalty do you think he Some other penalty 5.6%
should receive? Should he get: Don't know 27.8%
We would like to know about There are some cases 74.4% 340
your opinion of the death pen- where I would be in
alty generally. Which of the favor of the death
following two statements best penalty
describes your attitude toward




Would your feelings against Yes 12.2% 328
the death penalty prevent you No 69.8%
from returning a verdict of Don't know 18.0%
guilty at the first trial, even if
the evidence showed that he
was guilty?
Excludable: Either opposed to Yes 27.7% 329
the death penalty under any No 72.3%
circumstances or unable to
render a verdict of guilty
Respondent's race White 78.7% 343
Black 21.3%
may appear that the South Carolina post-Gregg death penalty statutet
has eliminated racial discrimination in the implementation of the death
sentence. This is only apparently the case, however, and the key to the
anomaly is the race of the victim. Defendants who were charged with
killing whites were 3.2 times more likely to have prosecutors seek the
death penalty than those charged with killing blacks (p<.001). While
the race of the victim was a significant factor in the decision to seek the
death penalty, the race of the defendant did condition the effect of vic-
tim's race on the prosecutor's decision to seek a death sentence. While
prosecutors sought the death penalty nearly four times as often for
blacks accused of killing whites as they did when blacks were accused of
17 See note 15 supra.
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TABLE 3
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEATH-QUALIFIED AND
EXCLUDED RESPONDENTS
QUESTION RESPONSE DEATH EXCLUDED X2 AND
QUALIFIED SIGNIFICANCE
N=238 N=91
From what you know about Probably guilty 48.3% 37.4% 8.94 (p<.02)
this case right now, do you Probably not-guilty 4.6% 14.3%
think the person charged with Don't know 47.1% 48.3%
this murder is:
If the person charged with this The death penalty 42.0% 8.9% 55.60 (p<.0001)
crime is found guilty in court, Life imprisonment 20.6% 55.6%
what penalty do you think he Some other penalty 3.4% 8.9%
should receive? Should he get: Don't know 34.0% 26.6%
Respondent's race White 87.3% 59.3% 30.01 (p<.0001)
Black 12.7% 40.7%
Respondent's sex Male 34.8% 29.6% .56 (p>.05)
Female 65.2% 70.4%
killing other blacks (p<.0001), they were only twice as likely to seek the
death sentence when white defendants had white rather than black vic-
tims (p<.05).
Data concerning intra-and interracial homicide as it pertains to the
decision to ask for the death penalty are reported in the last four panels
of Table 1. The death penalty is as likely to be sought for whites who
kill other whites as for blacks who kill whites (ratio=1.0 to 1, p=.24).
When white defendants are accused of killing blacks, the death penalty
is twice as likely to be sought than when blacks are accused of killing
other blacks (ratio=2.0 to 1, p>.05). The last two panels of Table 1
compare the inter- and intraracial ratios of death penalty requests.
Here it is shown that the death penalty is four times more likely to be
requested for whites accused of killing whites than for blacks who kill
other blacks (ratio=4.0 to 1, p<.001). Blacks accused of killing whites
are twice as likely to have the death penalty requested as are whites
accused of killing blacks (ratio=2.0 to 1, p>.05).
The data reveal a more subtle form of discrimination in post-Gregg
death penalty statutes. While it appears that white defendants are more
likely to have the death penalty requested in their cases, this is only
because white defendants are more likely to have white victims. It is the
presence of a white victim that accounts for the greater probability of a
death penalty request for white defendants. Discrimination still appears
to exist, but it now takes the form of a greater probability that prosecu-
tors will seek the death penalty if the victim is white.
Evidence concerning the effect of the exclusion of potential jurors
1982]
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and its subsequent effect in producing a jury prone to a guilty verdict
and the death penalty is reported in Tables 2 through 4. Table 2 reports
the highlights of the telephone surveys. Twenty-seven percent of the
respondents were Witherspoon-excludable, a figure which is close to the
1971 national Harris Poll's finding of twenty-three percent excludable.'3
Excluding these respondents from juries on the basis of their opposition
to the death penalty would differentially affect white and black respon-
dents, resulting in the exclusion of 20.7 percent of the whites compared
with 55.2 percent of the blacks (Table 4). This difference is statistically
significant (x2=30.Q1, p<.0001) and greater than the thirty-three per-
cent to fifty-two percent disparity between blacks and whites found in
the 1971 Harris Poll. 19
From the perspective of systematic bias in the process of sentencing
a defendant to death, a most interesting finding of this study is the rela-
tionship between excludability and the conclusions drawn by respon-
dents about the case. Compared with excludable respondents, death-
qualified subjects were more likely to say that they thought the defend-
ant was probably guilty, 48.3 percent versus 37.4 percent (Table 3).
Moreover, excluding potential jurors on the basis of their opposition to
the death penalty would result in excluding 54.2 percent who thought
the defendant was probably not guilty compared to 22.8 percent who
thought the defendant was probably guilty (Table 4).
The effect of excludability on the respondents' opinions regarding
the appropriate penalty in the case is even greater. Almost half (forty-
TABLE 4
IMPACT OF SCREENING PROSPECTIVE JURORS BY DEATH-
QUALIFICATION
(Percentages calculated by Row)
QUESTION RESPONSE DEATH EXCLUDED X2 AND
QUALIFIED SIGNIFICANCE
From what you know about Probably guilty 77.2% 22.8% 8.94 (p<.02)
this case right now, do you Probably not-guilty 45.80 54.2%
think the person charged with Don't know 71.8% 28.2%
this murder is:
If the person charged with this The death penalty 92.6% 7.4% 55.60 (p<.0001)
crime is found guilty in court, Life imprisonment 49.5% 50.5%
what penalty do you think he Some other penalty 50.0% 50.0%
should receive? Should he get: Don't know 77.1% 22.9%
Respondent's race White 79.3% 20.7% 30.01 (p<.0001)
Black 44.8% 55.2%
Respondent's sex Male 31.4% 68.6% .56 (p>.05)
Female 34.8% 65.2%
18 White, supra note 12, at 1187.
19 Id. at 1186.
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two percent) of the death-qualified subjects said that the defendant, if
convicted, should receive the death penalty compared to only 8.9 per-
cent of the excludables (Table 3). Exclusion of potential jurors based on
the Iztherspoon standard would 'esult in excluding only 7.4 percent who
favored the death penalty in those cases and 50.5 percent of those who
favored life imprisonment (Table 4). Our findings from these two tele-
phone surveys reveal a hidden source of bias in death sentencing and
bear out the warnings presented in the Hovqy case. Although the Wither-
spoon standard was intended to eliminate bias in capital juries, our evi-
dence suggests that it does not.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented here is as consistent as it is troubling, for it
suggests that the procedural safeguards established in Gregg and Wither-
spoon to eliminate inequities in the administration of the death penalty
have not accomplished their purpose. The courts have attempted to in-
troduce the rule of law into the administration of capital punishment.
The expressed intent of the decisions of the courts has been to reduce the
systematic irregularities that have degraded the quality of justice in cap-
ital cases. Our evidence and the evidence of others suggest that the
courts have succeeded in introducing only the illusion of the rule of law,
cloaking inequitable outcomes with rules that appear to guarantee eq-
uity. The post-Gregg death statute of South Carolina, thus far, has re-
sulted in a pattern of discrimination more subtle than that evidenced
before Furman. In addition, the death-qualification procedures ap-
proved in Wiherspoon appear to produce juries biased towards both con-
victions and the death penalty and disproportionately exclude blacks
from serving on capital juries. When one considers how long it took the
Supreme Court to recognize the more obvious forms of discrimination,
the prospects for addressing the more subtle forms are not good.
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